Tag Archives: cognition

Want to lie convincingly? Get practicing!

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Lying, the deliberate attempt to mislead someone, is a processes that we all engage in at some time or another. Indeed research has found that the average person lies at least once a day, suggesting that lying is a standard part of social interaction (1). Despite its common occurrence lying is not an automatic process. Instead it represents an advanced cognitive function; a skill that requires more basic cognitive abilities to be present before it can emerge. To lie an individual first needs to be able to appreciate the benefits of lying (e.g. a desire to increase social status) so that they have the motivation to behave deceitfully. Successful lying also requires ‘theory of mind’ or the ability to understand what another person knows. This is necessary so that the would-be liar can spot firstly the opportunity to lie, and secondly what sort of deception might be required to produce a successful lie. Finally lying also requires the ability to generate a plausible and coherent, but nonetheless fabricated description of an event. Given these prerequisites it is unlikely that we are ‘born liars’. Instead the ability to lie is believed to develop sometime between the ages of 2 and 4 (2). The fact that the ability to lie develops over time suggests that the our performance of the ‘skill’ of lying should be sensitive to practice. Do people who lie more often become better at it?

Lying is tiring!
Lying is considered more cognitively demanding that telling the truth due to the extra cognitive functions that need to be utilised to produce a lie. The idea that lying is cognitively demanding is supported both by behavioural data showing that deliberately producing a  misleading response takes longer, and is more prone to error, than producing a truthful response (3) and by neurological data showing that lying requires additional activity in the prefrontal areas of the brain when compared to truth telling (4). These observable differences between truth telling and lying allow a measure of ‘lying success’ to be created. For example a successful, or skilled liar, should be able to perform lies more quickly and accurately than a less successful liar, perhaps to the extent that there is no noticeable difference in performance between truth telling and lying in such individuals. Likewise, if the ability to lie is affected by practice, then practice should make lies appear more like the truth in terms of behavioural performance.

Practice makes perfect (but is this a lie)?
Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea that lying becomes easier with practice, much past research has failed to find an effect of practice on lying, either when measuring behavioural (3) or neuroimaging (5) markers of lying. Such results have led to the conclusion that lying may always be significantly more effortful than truth telling, no matter how practiced an individual is at deception.

A recent study (6) has re-examined this issue. They used a version of the ‘Sheffield Lie Test’ where participants are presented with a list of questions that require a yes/no response (e.g. ‘Did you buy chocolate today?’). The experiment involved three main phases. In the first, baseline phase, participants were required to respond truthfully to half the statements and to lie in response to the other half of the statements. In the middle, training phase, the statements were split into two groups. For a control group of statements the proportion that required a truthful response remained at 50% for all participants. For an experimental group of statements the proportion that required a truthful response was varied between participants. Participants either had to lie in response to 25%, 50% or 75% of these statements, thus giving the participants differing levels of ‘practice’ at lying. The final, test phase, was a repeat of the baseline phase. This design allowed two research questions to be assessed. Firstly the researchers could identify whether practice at lying reduced the ‘lie effect’ on reaction time and error rate (e.g. the increased reaction time and error rate that occurs when a participant is required to lie, compared to when they are required to tell the truth). Secondly the researchers could identify whether any reduction in the lie effect applied just to the statements on which the groups had experienced differing practice levels, or whether it also generalised to those statements where all groups had the same level of practice.

The results revealed that practice did produce an improvement in the ability to lie during the period when the training was actually taking place, and that this improvement applied to both the control statements and the experimental statements. The participants who had to lie more demonstrated reduced error rates and reaction times compared to those who had to lie less during the training phase. However in the test phase this improvement was only maintained for the set of statements where the frequency of lying had been manipulated. The group who had practiced lying on 75% of the experimental statements were no faster or more accurate at lying on the control statements than the group who had to lie in response to just 25% of the experimental statements. These results suggest that practice can make you better at lying, but this improvement is only sustained over time for the specific lies that you have rehearsed.

Some lies may be better than others!
One important criticism of most studies on the effect of practice on lying is that they tend to use questions or tasks that require binary responses (i.e. yes/no questions). However in real life lying often involves the concoction of complex false narratives,a form of lying that is likely to be far more cognitively demanding than just saying ‘No’ in response to a question whose answer is ‘Yes’. Likewise the lies tested in laboratory studies tend to be rehearsed, or at least prepared lies. In contrast many real-life lies are concocted at short notice, with the deceptive narrative being constructed in ‘real-time’, whilst the person is in the process of lying. It is likely that the effect of training, and how that training generalises to other lies, will be different for these more advanced forms of lying than it is for the more simple types of lies that tend to be tested under laboratory conditions. Given this, if a psychologist tells you that we know for certain how practice impacts on the ability to deceive, you can be sure that they are lying!

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References

(1) DePaulo, B.M., Kashy, D.A., Kirkendol, S.E., Wyer, M.M. & Epstein, J.A. (1996) Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70 (5) 979-995. http://smg.media.mit.edu/library/DePauloEtAl.LyingEverydayLife.pdf
(2) Ahern, E.C., Lyon, T.D. & Quas, J.A. (2011) Young Children’s Emerging Ability to Make False Statements. Developmental Psychology. 47 (1) 61-66. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21244149
(3) Vendemia, J.M.C., Buzan,R.F., & Green,E.P. (2005) Practice effects, workload and reaction time in deception. American Journal of Psychology. 5, 413–429. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/30039073?uid=3738032&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21101917386241
(4)Spence, S.A. (2008) Playing Devil’s Advocate: The case against MRI lie detection. Legal and Criminological Psychology 13, 11-25. http://psychsource.bps.org.uk/details/journalArticle/3154771/Playing-Devils-advocate-The-case-against-fMRI-lie-detection.html
(5) Johnson,R., Barnhardt,J., & Zhu, J.(2005) Differential effects of practice on the executive processes used for truthful and deceptive responses: an event-related brain potential study. Brain Research: Cognitive Brain Research 24, 386–404. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16099352
(6) Van Bockstaele, B., Verschuere, B., Moens, T., Suchotzki, K., Debey, E. & Spruyt, A. (2012) Learning to lie: effects of practice on the cognitive cost of lying. Frontiers in Psychology, November (3) 1-8. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23226137

Spooky goings on in Psychology!

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Given that it is Halloween, it seems only right to discuss some recent psychology experiments relating to potential paranormal phenomenon!

Can ‘psychic’ abilities be demonstrated during controlled experiments?

Can ‘psychics’ sense information others can’t?

Today Merseyside Sceptics Society published the results of a ‘Halloween psychic challenge’. They invited a number of the UK’s top psychics* to attempt to prove their abilities under controlled conditions, although only two psychics accepted the invitation (1, 2). In the test each psychic had to sit in the presence of 5 different female volunteers who were not known to them. These volunteers acted as ‘sitters’ and the psychics had to attempt to perform a ‘reading’ on them, in effect to use their putative psychic powers to obtain information about the sitter’s life and personality. During the reading the psychic  was separated from the sitter by a screen such that the psychic could not actually see the sitter. The psychics were also not allowed to talk to the sitters. These conditions ensured that any information the psychics retrieved was not gathered through processes that could be explained using non-psychic means (e.g. cold reading or semantic inference). The psychics recorded their readings by writing them down.

A copy of the 5 readings made by each psychic (one for each sitter) was given to each sitter and they were asked to rate how well each reading described them, and which reading provided the best description. If the psychic abilities were genuine, then each sitter should rate the reading that was made for them as being most accurate. Of the 10 readings (from the 2 psychics for each of the 5 sitters) only 1 was correctly selected by the sitter as being about them, no more than one would expect by chance. Moreover the average ‘accuracy ratings’ provided by the sitters (for the readings that were actually about them) was low for both psychics (approximately 3.2 out of 10). What of the one reading that a sitter did identify as an accurate description (see 1 for a full transcript of this reading)?  It is noticeable that in this reading the statements (some of which were not accurate) were either very general, or could be inferred from the knowledge that the sitter was a young, adult female (e.g ‘wants children’). The (correct) statement that most impressed the sitter (‘wants to go to South America’) was also pretty general and is probably true of a decent proportion of young woman. It can be safely concluded therefore that even this ‘accurate’ reading happened by chance.

In terms of the experimental design it is important to note that both psychics had, prior to the experiment, agreed to the methodology in the belief that they would be able to demonstrate their psychics powers under such conditions. Likewise both psychics rated their confidence in the readings they gave during the experiment highly, suggesting that they didn’t think that anything which occurred during the experiment might have upset their psychic powers. The study could be criticised for its small sample size, although this is due to many psychics, including some of the better known ones like Derek Acorah and Sally Morgan, apparently refusing to take part. It could therefore be argued that despite the psychics involved in the study failing the test, other ‘better’ psychics might pass. However such an argument remains merely speculative until such psychics agree to take part in controlled studies.

Although these negative results may not be surprising I still think it might be of interest to perform the experiment a different way. The problem with relying on the sitter’s ratings is that they may reflect attitudes of the sitters concerning psychic abilities (although all the sitters were apparently open to the idea of psychic powers being genuine). For example even though the sitters were unaware of which reading was about them, they could theoretically have given a low rating to an accurate reading to ensure that no psychic abilities were demonstrated. A better methodology might be to get each sitter to provide a self description, and then ask the psychic to choose the description that they think fits their reading of the person best. Such a test would also reduce the problems of interpreting the accuracy of the vague, general statements such as ‘wants children’ that psychics are prone to give. Another interesting idea would be to get psychics, along with non-psychics and self-confessed cold readers, to perform both a blind sitting (e.g. using a method similar to that described above) and a sitting where the participant can see and perhaps talk to the sitter. This could provide evidence to suggest whether claimed psychic abilities are really just a manifestation (even unintentionally) of cold-reading. If this were the case one would expect no difference in performance between the three groups in the blind test, but both the cold-readers and the psychics to perform better in the non-blind test (but with no difference between psychics and cold readers in that condition).

Can we see into the future?

The second set of experiments that I wish to discuss are potentially more exciting because there is at least a hint of positive results. Instead of testing the telepathy that psychics claim to possess (i.e. the ability to transfer information without the use of known senses) these studies investigated the phenomenon of ‘retroactive influence’ in a random sample of participants. Retroactive influence is the phenomenon of current performance being influenced by future events. In effect it suggests that people can (at least unconsciously) see into the future!

In a series of 9 well-controlled experiments the Psycholgist Daryl Bem produced results that appear to show that participant’s responses in a variety of tasks were influenced by events that occurred after those responses had been made (3). What is most impressive about these results is that Bem used a succession of different paradigms to produce the same effect, ensuring that the effect was not just due to an artifact in one particular experimental design. In brief this is what his results appear to demonstrate:

  1. Precognitive Detection: Participants had to select one of two positions in which they though an emotive picture would appear on a computer. However the computer randomly decided where to place the picture after the participant has made their selection. Nevertheless participants performance suggested that they were able to predict the upcoming positions of a photo at above chance levels,
  2. Retroactive Priming: In priming, the appearance of one stimulus (the ‘prime’) just before a second stimulus that the participant has to perform a task on, can either improve or worsen reaction time to that task, depending on whether the prime is congruent or incongruent with the second, ‘task’ stimulus. For example the appearance of a positive word prior to a negative image will slow reaction time on a valence classification task for the image (i.e. deciding whether the image is positive or negative) because the valence of the word is incongruent with the valence of the image. Bem’s results suggest that this reaction time effect also occurs when the prime is presented after both the image, and the time when the participant has made their response to it.
  3. Retroactive habituation: People tend to habituate to an image, for example an aversive image that has been seen before is rated as less aversive than one that has not been seen before. Bem demonstrated that this habituation can occur even when the repeated presentation occurs after the rating of the image is made (i.e. given the choice between two images, participants will select as less aversive the image that the computer will later present to them several times).
  4. Retroactive facilitation of recall: When participants had to recall a list of words, they were shown to be better at recalling items that they were later required to perform a separate task on, even though they were unaware of which items on the list they would be re-exposed to.

It is important to note that in all these experiments the selection (by computer) of which items would appear after the initial task, was performed independent of the participant’s response, so the results could not be due to the computer somehow using the participant’s responses to define its choice of which stimuli to present.

These findings caused much controversy and discussion within the psychological research community. Recently three independent attempts to replicate the ‘retroactive facilitation of recall’ effect have failed, producing null results despite using almost exactly the same method as Bem’s original study, and identical software (4). These failures of replication have highlighted problems in psychological research around the concepts of replication and the ‘file-drawer problem’ (5). There isn’t space to do justice to these issues here, suffice to say that the jury is still out on Bem’s findings at least partly because we can’t be sure whether other failed attempts to produce these effects remain unpublished, thus making Bem’s positive results appear more impressive that they might actually be. Another potential problem that is yet to be fully addressed is the issue of experimenter bias. Again this is a complex issue, and it appears to particularly be a problem in research into paranormal phenomenon, because positive results consistently tend to come from researchers who believe in said phenomenon, while negative results consistently come from sceptical researchers (see 6 for a discussion).

Retroactive facilitation of recall is currently the only of Bem’s effects that others have attempted to replicate in an open manner (i.e. by registering the attempt with an independent body before data collection, and by publishing the results after). Until more replication is attempted the question as to whether we can unconsciously see into the future must be considered open to debate. Hopefully these topics will be subject to much research in the future allowing us to find out whether these effects are real, or just the consequence of some other factor. It is worth mentioning at this point another paradigm that sometimes produces positive results regarding paranormal abilities. In experiments using a Ganzfeld Field (where participant’s auditory and visual systems are flooded with white noise and uniform light respectively) there is some evidence that those experiencing such stimulus are able to ‘receive’ information from someone sitting in a separate room (see 7 for a review). This appears therefore to be a potential demonstration of telepathy, although the effect is open to the same issues of replication and experimenter bias that surround Bem’s findings. Even ignoring these uncertainties, it should be noted that in these Ganzfeld Field experiments, and in Bem’s study, the size of the effects are very modest. For example in Bem’s precognitive detection paradigm, participants overall performance was at 53% as compared to chance level performance of 50%, while in the Ganzfeld experiments performance (choosing which one of four stimuli were being ‘transmitted’) is at around 32% against a chance performance of 25%. While these differences are found to be statistically significant (in some studies) because of the large number of participants or trials used, they don’t exactly represent impressive performance! Therefore even if such paranormal phenomenon were to be eventually proven as genuine, this wouldn’t mean that the sort of mind reading abilities claimed by psychics are actually possible!

 

*note that in this article the term ‘psychics’ is used merely as a label to define people who claim to have psychic powers, its use does not represent acceptance that such powers actually exist.

References
1) http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/oct/31/halloween-challenge-psychics-scientific-trial
2) http://www.merseysideskeptics.org.uk/
3) Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 407-425. Link
4) Ritchie, S. J., Wiseman, R., & French, C. C. (2012). Failing the Future: Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Replicate Bem’s ‘Retroactive Facilitation of Recall’ Effect. Plos One, 7(3). Link
5) Ritchie, S. J., Wiseman, R., & French, C. C. (2012). Replication, replication, replication. Psychologist, 25(5), 346-348. Link
6) Schlitz, M., Wiseman, R., Watt, C., & Radin, D. (2006). Of two minds: Skeptic-proponent collaboration within parapsychology. British Journal of Psychology, 97, 313-322. Link
7) Wackermann, J., Putz, P. & Allefeld, C. (2008) Ganzfeld-induced hallucinatory experience, its phenomenology and cerebral electrophysiology. Cortex 44, 1364-1378 Link

Image from ‘Seance on a wet afternoon’ (1964) Dir: Bryan Forbes, Distribution: Rank Organisation, Studio: Allied Film Makers.

How delusions occur, and why they may be widespread!

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Why do many people believe that Crop Circles are created by alien life forms?

It is a common occurrence to come across people who believe things that seem extraordinary, and who maintain that belief even in the face of huge amounts of contradictory evidence. For example despite vast amounts of evidence suggesting otherwise, there are people who believe that aliens create crop circles, that astrology can predict their future, and that the next Adam Sandler movie will be any good. A delusion can be defined as an extraordinary belief that is strongly held despite the presence of seemingly overwhelming evidence to the contrary. They are of particular interest to psychologists and neuroscientists because they occur in a number of neurological disorders, as well as in seemingly healthy individuals. For example a variety of paranoid or grandiose delusions frequently occur in psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Delusions relating to various bizarre forms of misidentification, such as the belief that a loved one is an imposter (the Capgras delusion) can also occur, often in forms of dementia such as Alzheimer’s Disease, and even in old age populations who do not exhibit any other noticeable cognitive impairment (1). Delusions of various types also occur in Parkinson’s disease, depression and as a result of other brain traumas such as those caused by strokes.

One error or two?
On a theoretical level there has traditionally been a distinction between 1-step and 2-step theories of delusions. 1-step theories (e.g. 2) suggest that a single perceptual deficit causes delusions. The delusion represents the most logical response to the bizarre perceptual information the brain is receiving as a result of the perceptual deficit. For example paranoid delusions may be caused by a perceptual bias towards threat signals which makes the sufferer conclude that some overbearing threat must be present to explain the constant warnings coming from the sensory environment. In contrast 2-step models (e.g. 3) argue that in addition to a perceptual deficit, there must also be a second, cognitive deficit. Such theories are motivated in part by the finding that there are some individuals who exhibit very similar perceptual deficits to those with delusions, but nevertheless do not hold delusional beliefs. For example there are individuals with bilateral damage to specific parts of the frontal lobe who, like patients with the Capgras delusion, experience a lack of familiarity when they come into contact with a particular close relative. However in contrast to the Capgras patients, the frontal lobe patients do not hold the belief that the relative is an imposter (4). Instead they are able to understand that it is their experience that has changed, rather than their relative. While 1-step theories suggest that delusions are caused by a single neuro-perceptual deficit, which varies in its nature depending on the nature of the delusion, 2-step theories require that an additional, separate deficit exists within the neural system involved in the formation and evaluation of beliefs. Variances in this second cognitive stage explain the likelihood of adopting a delusional belief in the context of disrupted perceptual experiences, and hence the difference between the Capgras and frontal lobe patients.

How are beliefs formed and updated?
If delusions are underpinned by a 2-step deficit, with the second, cognitive step being similar across delusional disorders, then the question arises as to what is the exact nature of this cognitive deficit? Recently an answer to this question has been proposed based off the insight that our ability to navigate the world is achieved through a process of inferential learning (e.g. 5). In short it is proposed that the brain creates representations as to how the external world is organized based off the information it receives. These models of the world by their nature encapsulate our belief system, as they contain representations of how different information is related, and what is likely to occur in any given situation. These models also allow the brain to predict both upcoming external stimulation, and internal experience. When actual experience differs from that which is expected, signals communicating this discrepancy (referred to as prediction-error signals) are sent back to the areas that generated the prediction, with the purpose of updating the model from which the original prediction arose. This process, when working optimally, allows us to adapt to new, unexpected information while at the same time enabling the majority of unexceptional information we encounter to be processed quickly and with minimum effort (because it has been predicted in advance).
Within this system the updating of beliefs can be framed using the principles of Bayesian inference, whereby the decision as to whether to adopt one of (say) two explanations to account for an unexpected stimulus is taken by balancing the inherent probability of each explanation (based off the current model of the world that the individual holds) with the likelihood of the unexpected stimulus having occurred if each explanation were true. When in the presence of a surprising or anomalous experience, such as those caused by the perceptual deficits believed to underpin the first step of delusion formation, an alteration in the belief pattern will only occur if the difference between the probability of the sensation occurring given that the new belief is true, compared to its probability of it occurring if the existing belief is true, is greater than the difference in the inherent probability of the two beliefs. In order to adopt an atypical or delusional belief, whose inherent probability would usually be very low, new evidence would have to appear that is almost inexplicable within the current belief system, while being fully explainable using the new belief. For example to believe that the moon is made of cheese would probably require you to actually travel to the moon, dig a bit of it up, put it in your mouth and taste cheese. Any lesser form of evidence would be discarded as a coincidence or trick, as the inherent probability of the moon being made of cheese given your existing belief system is (or at least should be) extremely low!

Delusions: A problem with prediction error?
In delusions it is proposed that this process of error-dependent updating of beliefs is disrupted. Most likely this occurs through a process whereby the weight (or importance) given to various prediction error signals is sub-optimal (e.g. 6, 7). If prediction error signals are given undue weight then potentially unimportant variances from expectation will become flagged as being highly salient. This in turn would mean that they are given unnecessary influence in updating our belief system. An anomalous experience that would normally not be treated as particularly relevant to understanding how the world works, either because of the unusual context in which it occurred, or its infrequency, would, if this deficit existed, be treated as important enough to warrant a change in the individual’s belief system. In terms of Bayesian inference, a system which gives undue weight to prediction errors would be one that had a bias towards accepting the influence of the new anomalous experiences without taking fully into account the relative inherent probabilities of the competing potential beliefs (which would usually strongly favour the non-delusional belief) (8). A less convincing anomalous experience would therefore be required in order to successfully challenge an existing non-delusional belief.
As an example, reconsider the aforementioned difference between patients with frontal lobe lesions and those with the Capgras delusion. In both types of patient the feeling of familiarity that is expected to appear on the physical recognition of a known person is absent. In the non-deluded individual, while this discrepancy is noted, it is not used to adopt the ‘imposter explanation’ because the correct weight is given to the prediction error and it is therefore not strong enough to overturn an otherwise functioning belief that the individual is who they claim to be (a belief that would be supported by several other pieces of information). In contrast the deluded individual gives far too much weight to the unexpected experience of non-familiarity, and the model is changed to accommodate it through the acquisition of the belief that the person is an imposter. As the prediction error deficit in such cases is restricted to the perceptual system dedicated to familiarity processing, other evidence that is contradictory to the imposter hypothesis, but which comes from a different source (e.g. people telling the deluded individual that they are wrong) is not treated with the same weight as the experience of absent familiarity. The delusion is therefore maintained even in light of strong contradictory evidence.

More widespread delusions
Whereas the Capgras delusion tends to be monothematic (i.e. it relates to just one known person having been replaced by an imposter, rather than people in general being imposters) faulty prediction error signalling can also be used to explain more widespread delusional thinking such as paranoia. For example one potentail consequence of the incorrect updating of belief systems is that the model of the world that the individual holds will itself become further divorced from reality, making it less able to accurately predict upcoming stimulation. This in turn will lead to a further increase in the frequency of prediction errors; to the extent that surprising or anomalous information would appear to occur with seemingly baffling frequency. If the deficit in prediction error exists across more than one perceptual domain, the inferential response to this might be to adopt a paranoid outlook to explain this constant uncertainty in the world. For example a delusion that MI5 are spying on the sufferer might be the best explanation for a world where objects and strangers seem to take on a sinister level of salience, and unexpected events seem to happen with alarming frequency (6).

Is healthy belief formation optimal, or are we all deluded?
The strength of a model of delusions based off deficits in the processes of inferential learning is that it can be used to explain the characteristics of general belief formation. For example deficits in prediction-error signaling may explain why some otherwise healthy individuals tend to adopt a wide variety of irrational beliefs. Such people may lack the perceptual deficit that causes the bizarre but specific anomalous experiences suffered by individuals with clinical delusions, but they may share with the clinical group a general deficit in inferential reasoning which results in a tendency to accept unusual beliefs that are poorly supported by available evidence. Along similar lines, variances from optimal processing (in terms of Bayesian inference) may explain more general cognitive biases that seem to be present in most people (including scientists!) and which are therefore presumably hard wired in the human brain because they have some adaptive evolutionary advantage. For example most people display a ‘belief bias’, the tendency to evaluate the validity of evidence based on their prior beliefs, rather than on the inherent validity of the evidence as could be assessed through logical reasoning (9). This bias could be said to be the result of our system of inferential learning being sub-optimal (in Bayesian terms) but in the opposite direction to that seen in delusion, such that we have a bias towards evaluating beliefs more in terms of their inherent probability (as we see it) without fully taking into account new evidence.
More generally the processes of inferential learning and belief formation may be able to explain why people who have had relatively similar types of upbringing and experience can often exhibit very different sets of beliefs. These differences are likely to be in part due to differences in the process of belief formation between individuals. It would seem very unlikely that anybody’s brain is able to process information in strict accordance with Bayesian inference, given that neural signals are coded through the transmission of neurotransmitters between groups of neurons, a process that is naturally susceptible to a significant amount of noise. Differences in beliefs between people are presumably therefore inevitable, as is the likelihood that we all, at some time, adopt irrational convictions. Of course these are just things that I believe, and I may be deluded in believing them!

Image courtesy of www.freedigitalphotos.net

References
(1) Holt, A.E., & Albert, M.L. (2007) Cognitive Neuroscience of delusions in aging. Neuropsychiatric disease and treatment, 2 (2) 181-189. Link
(2) Maher, B.A. (1974) Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder. Journal of Individual Psychology, 30:98-113. Link
(3) Coltheart, M, Langdon, R. & McKay, R. (2011) Delusional Belief. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 271-298 Link
(4) Tranel, D., Damasio, H. & Damasio, A.R. (1995) Double dissociation between overt and covert face recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7(4) 425-432. Link
(5) Friston, K. (2003). Learning and inference in the brain. Neural Networks, 16(9), 1325-1352. Link
(6) Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1), 48-58. Link
(7) Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X. J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H. (2010). Toward a neurobiology of delusions. Progress in Neurobiology, 92(3), 345-369. Link
(8) McKay, R. (2012). Delusional Inference. Mind & Language, 27(3), 330-355. Link
(9) Markovits, H. & Nantel, G. (1989). The belief bias effect in the production and evaluation of logical conclusions. Memory & Cognition, 17(1) 11-17. Link

Can a neuroscientist read your mind?

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Are the contents of your mind really 'confidential' or will your thoughts one day be accessible to others?

Media reports into recent research have claimed that neuroscientists are now effectively able to perform ‘mind reading’. Such reporting inevitable raises ethical questions about what applications such research might eventually be put to, and, judging by some of the comments that the on-line versions of these articles have provoked, have alarmed some people regarding the eventual path that such research might take. But how accurate is the claim that neuroscientific techniques can read minds?

Early this year an article in the Guardian  ( http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/jan/31/mind-reading-program-brain-words ) reported that:

‘Scientists have picked up fragments of people’s thoughts by decoding the brain activity caused by words that they hear.’

Reporting on the same experiment the Daily Mail ( http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2095214/As-scientists-discover-translate-brainwaves-words–Could-machine-read-innermost-thoughts.html ) claimed:

 ’It’s a staggering development that could have tremendous implications….judges could use mind-reading machines to find out if murder suspects are telling the truth….mind reading devices might be used to eavesdrop covertly on the most private thoughts and dreams.’

The experiment in question, conducted by Dr Brian Pasley and colleagues (1) involved the recruitment of patients who were to undergo brain surgery. The researchers placed electrodes upon the auditory areas of the brain during the period when the patients’ skulls were open and their cerebral cortex exposed. They then played the patients a sequence of different words and recorded the electrical activity generated by the auditory cortex in response to this speech. Using complex modeling procedures they were able to reconstruct the spoken words solely from the neural signals recorded by the electrodes. Furthermore they were able to successfully apply this model to the electrical responses generated by a separate set of words that had not been used in creation of the model (e.g. which were in effect ‘novel’ to the model) suggesting that the model could theoretically be applied to reconstruct any speech heard by the patient.

While these results are undoubtedly impressive, has the media coverage of them been accurate? In terms of the Guardian’s report, their claim that this represents a decoding of ‘fragments of thoughts’ seems to depend on a rather broad definition of the term ‘thoughts’. What the research did was to reconstruct auditory stimuli that the auditory cortex was in the process of analysing. What has been achieved therefore is the decoding, at a detailed level, of the perceptual process, NOT the reading of internally generated thoughts. This is a significant step away from ‘decoding thoughts’ as the  process being decoded is entirely dependent on the presentation of an external stimulus. This doesn’t therefore represent ‘mind reading’ because the same result could theoretically be achieved without reference to the brain, e.g. by taking measurements from the relevant sensory organ or by just observing the sensory stimulus itself (2). Even if the research did represent mind reading, there seems little justification for the Daily Mail’s claim that the research could lead to ‘covert eavesdropping’. It should be obvious that the methodology required not only the opening up of the participant’s skull, but also the co-operation of the participant in allowing data to be taken for the construction of the model. Furthermore what is not mentioned by either article is that the reconstructed words were not actually intelligible to a human listener, but had to be ‘recognised’ via a speech recognition algorithm (an example of the reconstructed speech can be heard here:  http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1001251#s5).

Actual Mind Reading?

While the results of Dr Pasley’s study required the participant’s brains to be exposed, other neuroimaging methods are not so intrusive, and could therefore be considered closer to the covert mind-reading reported by the Mail. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) allows brain activity to be measured in a non-invasive way, so that no surgery of any kind is required (although lying down in a scanner which costs millions of pounds and is the size of a small boat, is still required, making it far from ‘covert’!). MRI studies have produced some equivalent results to that of Pasley’s study, but using visual stimuli; with images (3) and short movies (4) having been reconstructed purely from data obtained from MRI scans. Of course such results don’t represent mind reading any more than Dr Pasley’s study, since they reflect a reconstruction of external sensory information. However other MRI studies have produced results that have allowed scientists to predict processes occurring within a participant’s brain that are not directly tied to the characteristic of external stimuli. A couple of studies by Yukiyasu Kamitani and Frank Tong (5,6) have shown that models can be created that allow an observer to identify to which stimulus a participant is (covertly) attending to. In effect these studies, and others like them, use the output from the perceptual processing mechanisms of the brain to identify how ‘top-down’ influences (such as expectation and attention) are driving perception. Strictly speaking they represent mindreading as although the mental processes in question are still involved in analysing external stimuli, it is not necessarily possible to garner the information provided by the MRI data in any other way (short of asking the person themselves). This is because the ‘top-down influences’ in question arise internally from the brain, rather than being a function of the external stimulus. Neuroimaging has enabled the concept of mind reading to be taken further however, into the realms of decoding mental events that don’t rely on any external stimulation at all. Recent studies have found that it is possible to decode what broad categories of objects someone is imagining, in the absence of any coincident external stimulation (7) although the performance level of the model is reasonably modest (~ 50%). Similarly, it also appears that the results of basic decision making processes can be identified from brain activity, with decisions relating to which button to press and when to press it (8) and whether a participant in lying (9) being decipherable using models constructed in a similar way to those already described. Interestingly the neural information that allows these decisions to be decoded occurs many seconds BEFORE the decision has actually been made, highlighting how conscious actions are likely driven by brain processes that are outside conscious awareness, rather than being the result of conscious ‘free will’. Most recently such work has been extended to more complex scenarios, with MRI data being used to predict at what point in solving an algebraic problem a child is at, and whether they are performing the calculation correctly (10).

The possibility of covert mind reading?

Clearly the aforementioned examples reflect mind reading, but do they represent the top of a ‘slippery slope’ that will lead to technology that will allow the sort of covert eavesdropping envisioned by the Daily Mail? The first impediment to such technology is the process of neuroimaging itself. MRI scanners are far from being portable enough to allow forced or covert application of brain scanning. Furthermore MRI scanning involves the production of a large magnetic field and the firing of electromagnetic pulses towards the object being imaged, both functions that would be totally impractical outside a controlled, isolated environment. Other neuroimaging methods, such as EEG, function by recording the electrical remnants of brain activity from outside the skull, and are therefore cheaper and more portable than MRI. However they lack the spatial resolution that would be required for any sophisticated mind reading application, and in any case they are extremely sensitive to external noise, again making them unsuitable for use outside of controlled environments.

Even if we assume that future technological advances would allow systems to be developed that would enable covert collection brain activity data, would such technology enable your innermost thoughts to be deciphered? There are a number of reasons to doubt that this would be possible. Current mind reading models are only able to distinguish between very broad categories of thoughts, or between very coarse categories of decisions (e.g. lie/truth, attending to one or other stimulus). To be able to read the specific details of an individual’s thoughts you would need models that distinguished between the literally billions of different things that someone could be thinking about, and the multitude of different decisions that they could make. To even create such models would involve the co-operation of individuals in a data collection process that would take an incalculable length of time. Even if such data were collected, and the subsequent required level of computation to create accurate models were possible, the ability to generalize such models to the brain activity of other individuals would rely on an assumption that every person’s brain being identical in terms of where different individual thoughts and memories are stored. This seems extremely unlikely, and is in fact counter to what we know about individual differences in brain anatomy and function. Thus while it is possible to aggregate data across participant to produce mind-reading for coarse decisions, it would be impossible to replicate such a method to distinguish between more subtle categories of thought. Even in situations where co-operation of the participant is attained, and only a coarse distinction between different psychological states is required, such mind reading techniques are problematic. Taking the example of the mooted ‘MRI Lie detector’ such a system will always be somewhat unreliable because, just like the current physiological lie detectors, they could be easily deceived if the participant can train themselves to act as if the truth is a lie (or vice versa). This is because the brain activity which is associated with lying most likely relates to the emotional and cognitive processes involved in creating a false story, rather than to lying per se. It follows that simply engaging in these same emotional and cognitive processes while telling the truth should produce neural activity which mimics that produced by a lie. If even the decoding of simple decisions can be subverted easily, it would seem impossible that attempts at more subtle discriminations of different thoughts would not be subject to even greater uncertainty. Finally it is important to note that all the forms of mind reading reviewed here are the result of probabilistic calculations. The parts of the brain that are deemed active at a certain point in time are the result of statistical computations as to whether a small signal is reflective of task-related neural activity or noise. Likewise the classification of such activity as belonging to one category of thought/decision over another is also based off probabilistic inference. There is no certainty in such a process; in fact it is fraught with uncertainty.

To conclude it seems very unlikely that neuroimaging methods will ever be able to perform the sort of mind reading predicted by scare stories in the press. In some cases such methods may not even represent a particular improvement on the sort of mind reading applications that already exist. What the mind reading research discussed in this article does allow is a greater understanding of how the brain works, which in turn provides insight into how the brain achieves the myriad feats it performs so frequently with apparent ease. The most fruitful practical application of such knowledge is likely to be in the treatment of patients with brain damage. For example the limited mind reading functions possible from existing neuroimaging methods may allow technology to be developed that would allow patients who suffer from brain damage to the extent that they cannot communicate using their peripheral nervous system, some primitive form of communication through their brain activity. In contrast your private thought and memories are likely to remain safe from the prying eyes of neuroscientists!

Image (top right) courtesy of Idea Go:  http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/images/view_photog.php?photogid=809

References

(1) Pasley BN, David SV, Mesgarani N, Flinker A, Shamma SA, et al. (2012) Reconstructing Speech from Human Auditory Cortex. PLoS Biol 10(1): e1001251. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001251 http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1001251

(2) Tong, F. & Pratte, M.S. (2012) Decoding Patterns of Human Brain Activity. Annual Review of Psychology, 63: 483-509.  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21943172

(3)  Miyawaki, Y. Uchida, H. et al (2008) Visual Image Reconstruction from Human Brain Activity using a Combination of Multi-scale Local Image Decoders.. Neuron 60, 915–929, http://iopscience.iop.org/1742-6596/197/1/012021

(4)  Nishimoto, S., Vu, A.T., et al (2011) Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies. Current Biology 21, 1641–1646 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211009377

(5) Kamitani Y, Tong F. 2005. Decoding the visual and subjective contents of the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 8:679–85  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1808230/

(6) Kamitani Y, Tong F. 2006. Decoding seen and attended motion directions from activity in the human visual cortex. Curr. Biol. 16:1096–102 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1635016/

(7) Reddy, L., Tsuchiya, N. & Serre, T. (2010). Reading the mind’s eye: Decoding category information during mental imagery. Neuroimage. 50(2) 818-825  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2823980/

(8) Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD. 2008. Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 11:543–45  http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v11/n5/full/nn.2112.html

(9) Davatzikos C, Ruparel K, Fan Y, Shen DG, Acharyya M, et al. 2005. Classifying spatial patterns of brain activity with machine learning methods: application to lie detection. NeuroImage 28:663–68  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811905005914

(10) Anderson, J.R. (2012) Tracking Problem Solving by Multivariate Pattern Analysis and Hidden Markov Model algorithms. Neuropsychologia, 50(4) 487-498. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0028393211003605

 

Anxiety enhances sense of smell

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By Maria Panagiotidi

Anxious people have a heightened sense of smell, when it comes to sniffing out a threat, according to a new study by Elizabeth Krusemark and Wen Li from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the US. The results of their study will be published online in the journal Chemosensory Perception.

The sense of smell is an essential tool for survival in animals. It allows them to detect, locate and identify predators in the surrounding environment. In fact, the olfactory-mediated defence system is so important in animals, that the mere presence of predator odours can evoke potent fear and anxiety responses.

Smells also evoke powerful emotional responses in humans. Krusemark and Li hypothesized that in humans, detection of a particular bad smell may signal danger of a noxious airborne substance, or a decaying object that carries disease. Also, they speculated that the level of response to the above could underlie phobias or anxiety related disorders.

The researchers tested their hypotheses by combining assessment of state-level anxiety, psychophysical testing, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques.  They recruited 14 young adult participants who were exposed to three types of odours: neutral pure odor, neutral odor mixture, and negative odor mixture. The participants were asked to detect the presence or absence of an odour in an MRI scanner. During scanning, the researchers also measured skin conductance response (a measure of arousal level), and monitored the subjects’ breathing patterns. After completing the odour detection task, the participants were asked to rate their current level of anxiety using a standardised clinical test.

The authors found that as anxiety levels rose, so did the subjects’ ability to discriminate negative odours accurately – suggesting a ‘remarkable’ olfactory acuity to threat in anxious subjects. The same pattern was found in the skin conductance results which showed that anxiety also heightened emotional arousal to smell-induced threats.

Krusemark and Li uncovered amplified communication between the sensory and emotional areas of the brain in response to negative odours, particularly in anxiety. This increased connectivity could be responsible for the heightened arousal to threats.

These findings could help researchers elucidate the aetiology of the unfortunate and debilitating symptoms that perpetuate anxiety disorders.

 

Reference:

Krusemark EA & Li W (2012). Enhanced olfactory sensory perception of threat in anxiety: an event-related fMRI study. Chemosensory Perception. DOI 10.1007/s12078-011-9111-7

You can find the article here: http://www.springerlink.com/content/a268t518p1x59v68/

The dangers of self-report

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A common methodology in behavioural science is to use self-report questionnaires to gather data. Data from these questionnaire can be used to identify relationships between scores on the variable(s) that the questionnaire is assumed to measure and either performance on behavioural tasks, physiological measures taken during an experiment, or even scores obtained from other questionnaires (some studies just report on the correlations between batches of self-report measures!). Self-report measures are popular for a number of reasons. Firstly they represent a ‘cheap’ way (in terms of both time and cost) of obtaining data. Secondly they can be easily implemented to large samples, especially with the advent of on-line questionnaire distribution sites such as Survey Monkey. Finally they can be used to measure constructs that would be difficult to obtain with behavioural or physiological measures (for example facets of personality such as introversion). This issue of self-report methodology is important because studies that use this method are regularly reported in the media (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-17209448 for a recent example) and therefore have a significant impact on how the general public perceive scientific research. I therefore think it is important to discuss potential problems with self-report measures.

Most (but certainly not all) questionnaires that are used in behavioural research undergo  testing for reliability, to check that they produce consistent results when applied to the same population over time. More importantly they are normally also tested for validity, to check that the questionnaire measures what it claims to measure. Such tests are done following the logic that the questionnaire should be able to discriminate participants in a similar way to relevant non-self report measures. For example scores on a questionnaire measuring depression should be able to discriminate between depressed patients and controls, while scores on a questionnaire measuring diet should be able to predict the ‘Body Fat Percentage’ of respondents with reasonable accuracy. While such tests can act to increase confidence that a questionnaire is measuring what it claims to measure they are not foolproof. For example just because a depression questionnaire can discriminate between patients and controls does not mean that it measures depression well, as the two groups will likely vary in several different ways. Likewise a questionnaire that distinguishes between patients and controls may not be able to identify the (presumably) more subtle differences between depressed and non-depressed healthy individuals, or the range of depressive tendencies within the healthy population. In fact that are a large number of reasons why questionnaire may not be entirely valid, including the following:

Honesty/Image management – researchers who use self-report questionnaires are relying on the honesty of their participants. The degree to which this is a problem will undoubtedly vary with the topic of the questionnaire, for example participants are less likely to be honest about measures relating to sexual behaviour, or drug use, than they are about caffeine consumption, although it is unwise to assume, even when you are measuring something relatively benign, that participants will always be truthful. Worse, the level at which participants will want to manage how they appear will no doubt vary depending on personality, which means that the level of dishonesty may vary significantly between different groups that a study is trying to compare.

Introspective ability – Even if a participant is trying to be honest, they may lack the introspective ability to provide an accurate response to a question. We are probably all aware of people who appear to view themselves in a completely different light to how others see them. Undoubtedly we are all to some extent unable to introspectively assess ourselves completely accurately. Therefore any self-report information we provide may be incorrect despite our best efforts to be honest and accurate.

Understanding – Participants may also varying regarding their understanding or interpretation of particular questions. This is less a problem with questionnaires measuring concrete things like alcohol consumption, but is a very big problem when measuring more abstract concepts such as personality. From personal experience I have participated in an experiment where I was asked at regular intervals to report how ‘dominant’ I felt. As I can honestly say I don’t monitor my feelings of ‘dominance’ and how they change over time, I know that my responses to the question were pretty random. Even if I could conjure an understanding of what the question was getting at, it would be impossible to ensure that everyone who completed the questionnaire interpreted that question in the same way that I did.

Rating scales – Many questionnaires use rating scales to allow respondents to provide more nuanced responses than just yes/no. While yes/no questions do often appear restrictive in terms of how you can respond, using rating scales can bring their own problems. People interpret and use scales differently, what I might rate as ’8′ on a 10 point scale, someone with the same opinion might only rate as a ’6′ because they interpret the meanings of the scale points differently. There is research which suggests that people have different ways of filling out ratings scales (1). Some people are ‘extreme responders’ who like to use the edges of the scales, whereas other like to hug around the midpoints and rarely use the most outer points. This naturally produces differences in scores between participants that reflects something other than what the questionnaire was designed to measure. A related problem is that of producing nonsense distinctions. For example studies sometimes appear where participants are given a huge rating scale to choose from, for example a scale of 1-100 to rate the confidence of a decision as to whether two lines are the same length (2).  Is anyone really capable of segmenting their certainty over such a decision into 100 different units? Is there really any meaningful difference, even within the same individual, between a certainty of 86 and a certainty of 72 in such a paradigm? Any differences found in such experiments therefore run the risk of being spurious.

Response bias – This refers to individual’s tendency to respond a certain way, regardless of the actual evidence they are assessing. For example on a yes/no questionnaire asking about personal experiences, some participants might be biased towards responding yes (i.e. they may only require minimal evidence to decide on a yes response, so if an experience has happened only once they may still respond ‘yes’ to a question relating to whether they have had that experience). Alternatively other participants may have a conservative response bias and only respond positively to such questions if the experience being inquired about has happened regularly. This is a particular problem when the relationship between different questionnaires is assessed, as a correlation between two different questionnaires may simply reflect the response bias of the participants being consistent across questionnaires, rather than any genuine relationship between the variables the questionnaire is measuring.

Ordinal Measures – Almost all self-report measures produce ordinal data. Ordinal data is that which only tells you the order that units can be ranked in, not the distances between them. It is contrasted with interval data which tells you the exact distances between different units. This distinction is easiest to define by thinking of a race. The position in which each runner finishes in is an ordinal measure. It tells you who is fastest and slowest, but not the relative differences between the different runners. In contrast the finishing time is an interval measure, as it provides information relating to the relative differences between the runners. Even when the questionnaire measures something that could be measured in SI units, and is therefore theoretically an interval scale (i.e. alcohol consumption) it is doubtful whether the responses can really be treated as interval because of the problems relating to response accuracy raised above. More pertinently most self-report measures in behavioural science relate to constructs, such a personality measures, that can’t be measured in interval units and are therefore always ordinal. The problem with ordinal data is not the data itself, but the common practice of using parametric statistical techniques with such data, because these tests make assumptions about the distribution of the data that cannot be met when said data is ordinal. Deviations from such assumptions can lead to incorrect inferences being made (3) bringing the conclusions of such studies into question.

Control of sample – this has become more of an issue with the advent of online questionnaire distribution sites like Survey Monkey. Previously a researcher had to be present when a participant completed a questionnaire, now with these tools the researcher need never meet any of their participants. While this allows much bigger samples to be collected much more quickly, it does cause several concerns over the sample make up. For example there are few controls to stop the same person filling in the same questionnaire multiple times. There is also little disincentive for participants to respond with spurious responses, and there is little control over how much attention the participant pays to various parts of the questionnaire. Conversely, from personal experience, I know that sometimes it is hard to complete these questionnaires because there is no way of asking the researcher for clarification as to the meaning of various questions. Finally as the researcher has lost control over the make up of their sample, they may end up with a sample which is vastly skewed towards a certain type of person, as only certain types of people are likely to fill in such questionnaires. These issues existed even before the advent of online data collection (e.g. (4)), but collecting data ‘in absentia’ exacerbates the size of such problems.

Although there are many problems with using self-report questionnaires they will continue to be a popular methodology in behavioural science because of their utility. While it might be preferable for every variable a researcher wants to investigate to be manipulated systematically using behavioural techniques, this is in practice impossible as it would severely restrict what each individual research design could achieve, and would make certain topics effectively impossible to research. Self-report measures are therefore a necessary tool for behavioural research. Furthermore some of the problems listed above can be countered through the careful design and application of self-report measures. For example response bias can be removed by ‘reversing’ half the questions on a questionnaire so that the variable is scored by positive responses on half the questions and negative responses on the other half, thus cancelling out any response bias. Likewise statistical techniques are being devised to attempt to pick out dishonest reporting, a problem that can also be attenuated by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality of responses (e.g. the researcher leaving the room when the participant is completing the questionnaire). Given this it would be wrong to dismiss any findings that are reliant on self-report measures. However whenever you read about research where self-report measures have been used to draw conclusions about human behaviour, it is always worth bearing in mind the multitude of problems associated with such measures, and how they might impact on the validity of the conclusions that have been drawn.

(1) Austin, E. J., Gibson, G. J., Deary, I. J., McGregor, M. J., & Dent, J. B. (1998). Individual response spread in self-report scales: personality correlations and consequences. Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 421–438. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S019188699700175X

(2) Balakrishnan, J. D. (1999). Decision processes in discrimination: Fundamental misrepresentations of signal detection theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 25, 1189-1206. http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1999-11444-002

(3) Wilcox, R. R. (2005). Introduction to robust estimation and hypothesis testing. Academic Press. ISBN: 0127515429

(4) Fan, X., Miller, B. C., Park, K., Winward, B. W., Christensen, M., Grotevant, H. D., et al. (2006). An exploratory study about inaccuracy and invalidity in adolescent self-report surveys. Field Methods,18, 223–244. http://fmx.sagepub.com/content/18/3/223.short

Humans as data sources!

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I have recently begun collecting data for an experiment.  Data collection is the ‘bread and butter’ of science, without it there is no data, and therefore no results, conclusions or theories. While scientists can collect data from almost anything, as I am involved in behavioural science the data I require almost always comes from people; volunteers who agree to participate in an experiment. Using human participants (volunteers were previously referred to as ‘subjects’, but this term was dropped because it suggests that the volunteer is ‘subject’ to the experiment, rather than a willing participant) as your main data source produces additional (or at least different) problems to that presented from other data sources. I presume that in natural sciences, materials are ordered from a supplier, and therefore can be (hopefully) acquired to a predetermined timescale at a predictable cost. This is not the case with using participants, whose availability depends on the willingness of the local (normally student) population to submit to your study. Likewise whereas physical data-sources presumably perform reasonably consistently (i.e. putting the same quantity of lithium into the same quantity of water will always produce similar results, as long as other relevant variables are held constant) the same cannot be said for humans. The performance of two participants, tested under identical conditions, can vary drastically, even when the participants are from very similar backgrounds. Similarly an individual participant’s performance can vary widely during an experiment as concentration and motivation fluctuate. These factors produces a large amount of variance in the resulting data that is not due to the experimental manipulations the study is designed to investigate. The consequence of this is that the amount of data that needs to be collected in order to overcome such variance, and therefore provide a valid result, increases.

The variability in human performance also generates the further problem of generalisation. How can you be sure that the participants you have used in your study provide data that can be generalised to humans in general, given that individuals vary widely on how they perform the task? Larger samples (more data collection!) can make a sample more representative, but as undergraduates are usually the easiest source of data, inevitably most studies involving humans utilise samples that are non-representative of the general population to a greater or lesser extent. You could write an entire book on the issues around sampling and generalisation (indeed many have (1)) suffice to say that when you read any behavioural science research, especially that which is weighted towards the ‘social science’ end of the spectrum, it is worth considering the sort of people who may have participated in the research, and how that may effect the results that were found.

There are other, more basic problems with using humans as a data source.  Participants may fail to show up for the study, they may fail to understand what is required of them in ways that you couldn’t predict, they may even not take the experiment seriously, making little effort or deliberately producing nonsensical data. In physical science I suspect the main problem that can occur with an experiment is equipment failure. This is also a danger with behavioural experiments, but ‘participant failure’ is often a more pressing concern.

A final issue with using humans as a data source is that any study involving humans requires ethical approval, meaning that the research design is scrutinized by a committee prior to data collection for anything that might be deemed unacceptable. Ethical procedures are in place for a good reason, as in the past certain scientists were subjecting volunteers to all sorts of unpleasant and/or morally dubious procedures in the name of science (2). However perhaps inevitably ethical checks tend towards the cautious in terms of their application. While for many behavioural and social science research, ethical approval is merely a formality, it can restrict scientific enquiry for those of us that are interested in the facets of human behaviour that can only be evoked through manipulations of the participant’s emotional state or physical comfort.

So, given that I have just spent 700 words complaining about the problems of using humans as data sources,  why have I chosen a career path which relies so heavily on collecting data from humans? Well there are some advantages of performing research on humans. Most importantly humans are (to me at least) the most interesting subject in science. You can keep your chromatography, your mutagenesis and your particle accelerators, nothing they produce will ever be as interesting to me as investigations into human mind and behaviour. The variability in human performance which causes us so many problems is actually the main reason the subject of psychology is so interesting. A second advantage to behavioural research is that it allows you to meet a lot of different people who volunteer for your study for a variety of different reasons. The fact that certain people are prepared to give up their time and submit themselves to the often unpleasant or tedious tasks that make up your research project has helped reaffirm my faith in human nature after years of working in soul-destroying office jobs. Apart form anything else, the actual data collection part of a behavioural study certainly helps to break up a research process which would otherwise mainly consist of reading journal articles and staring at a matrix of numbers on a computer screen.

I’ll be coming to the end of the data collection process soon. I will then have weeks of grappling with the resultant data to look forward to!! As a final plea, if there are any men out there who fancy participating in my research then get in contact, as I still need a few human ‘data sources’ to complete my study!

(1) Rao (2000) Sampling methodologies with applications. Chapman & Hall
(2) See the early chapters of Naomi Klein’s book “The Shock Doctrine” (Penguin, 2008) for a description of some particularly unethical experiments performed in the US.

What is cognitive neuroscience, and why should anyone care?

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I often have trouble explaining to people what I am doing for my PhD. This is not a consequence of the topic being so fiendishly complex that no-one else can understand it. Instead it comes from a fact that the area of study seems to fall between several difference subject areas. When I tell people that I am doing my PhD within the Neuroscience department I imagine this provokes images of test-tubes, microscopes and pipettes, and perhaps associations with genetics, animal testing and stem cells. In reality I have little knowledge or experience of any of these topics, having last done ‘traditional’ lab work while I was at secondary school. If you asked me to dissect something, I would probably run a mile! When I instead say that I work within the psychiatry department this probably brings up an altogether different set of images, of drug therapies, ECT and perhaps of ‘talking therapies’ such as CBT (cognitive behavioural therapy). In fact both the above statements regarding my PhD are true, as the Psychiatry department sits within the Neuroscience department, but neither appear to give an accurate impression of what I actually do.

The best description of my area of research is ‘cognitive neuroscience’, but what does this mean? Cognitive Neuroscience relates to the study of the neural basis of behaviour. Roughly, it bridges the gap between biological sciences, and behavioural sciences such as psychology and psychiatry. It attempts to determine how the brain achieves the legion of processes that it performs – crudely ‘what part of the brain does what’! Cognitive neuroscience has only been seen as a separate area of study relatively recently, partly because the advanced brain imaging techniques which the discipline now heavily relies on have only been developed within the last 30 years (according to Wikipedia the term ‘cognitive neuroscience’ itself was coined in the back of a taxi in 1979!!). However scientists from various disciplines have been trying to understand how the brain functions, using whatever methods were available, since at least the 19th century.

Cognitive Neuroscience relies heavily on work done within behavioural sciences, which have served to define how human behaviour and cognition can be classified into concepts that can be studied. Unsurprisingly therefore, cognitive neuroscience research normally involves the application of a behavioural task which has already been utilised without the use of brain imaging techniques. One question this raises is what does knowing how the brain achieves it function tell us that purely behavioural science does not?  Psychologists have been ably investigating the details of mental processes for well over a century without knowing (or even caring) what part(s) of the brain are involved. The knowledge that spatial processing is largely dependent on the Hippocampus is not necessary for studying the intricacies and individual differences in spatial processing. So what does an understanding of the neural basis of mental processes achieve?

Firstly understanding the neural basis of a mental process can help distinguish between different theories relating to how that process is performed. Behavioural data is often not sufficient to distinguish between competing theories (e.g. whether a particular process is performed in totality, or whether it is split into components processes that are dealt with separately, and whether such component processes are performed in parallel or in series). Neuroimaging data can be used to provide strong evidence in relation to these questions (1).  Secondly cognitive neuroscience can provide insight into areas of cognition that were difficult or impossible to address without neuroimaging techniques. For example much work has been done on trying to understand what the brain does ‘at rest’ (i.e. when no task is being performed, effectively ‘mind wandering’) which can allow us to understand how the brain might work as an self-contained integrative mechanism. As, by definition, non-task related mental processes can’t be manipulated systematically, it is hard to investigate these processes from a purely behavioural standpoint. Similarly neuroimaging has enabled scientists to begin to uncover the neural basis of ‘consciousness’, raising interesting questions about how our experience of the world is constructed (3). These achievements of cognitive neuroscience help elucidate the nature of human thought and behaviour, shedding light on why we act the way that we do. 

On a larger scale, understanding how the brain is able to processes such a large variety of information, and produce such a wide variety of responses, can help guide the design of artificial intelligence systems intended to mimic human abilities, facilitating advances in medicine and engineering. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, knowing how the brain produces certain responses can lead to the development of interventions to alter the functioning of the appropriate brain areas when those responses become problematic (e.g. during mental health disorders). One of the major aims of cognitive neuroscience is to identify the neural deficiencies that mark various psychiatry and neurodegenerative disorders. From this information it becomes potentially possible to identify methods of combating such deficiencies. Indeed biological interventions are being developed that can target specific brain areas, potentially offering great hope for improving the therapeutic treatment of mental disorders.  

References

(1) Jonides et al (2006). What has Functional Neuroimaging told us about the Mind? So many examples, so little space. Cortex, 42, 414-417 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jjonides/pdf/2006_3.pdf

(2) Van den Heuval & Pol (2010) Exploring the brain network: A review on resting-state fMRI functional connectivity. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 20(8), 519-534 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0924977X10000684

(3) Dehaene & Changeux (2011) Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing. Neuron, 70. 200-225 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627311002583